Logout | EntryBit Docs

RP-initiated logout ends the user’s EntryBit browser session — the cookie the system browser holds after signing in. It is the OIDC end_session_endpoint (OIDC RP-Initiated Logout 1.0), advertised in discovery.

GET  /api/oauth/logout
POST /api/oauth/logout

Two different logouts. Revoking the refresh token signs your app out (kills its tokens). This endpoint signs the browser session out, so the next /authorize re-prompts for a password instead of silently reusing the cookie. On shared devices you want both.

Parameters

GET takes query parameters; POST takes the same fields in an application/x-www-form-urlencoded body.

Parameter	Notes
`id_token_hint`	The `id_token` previously issued to the client. Its signature must verify (it may be expired). Required to actually terminate the session.
`post_logout_redirect_uri`	Where to send the browser afterward — must exactly match the client’s registered post-logout list.
`state`	Opaque value echoed to the post-logout redirect.
`client_id`	Optional; when present it must match the hint’s audience.

Behavior

The session is terminated only when the id_token_hint:

verifies — valid signature and issuer (expiry is not required); and
matches — its sub equals the currently signed-in user.

Then the browser is redirected to post_logout_redirect_uri only if it exactly matches one of the client’s registered post_logout_redirect_uris (a separate allowlist from login redirect URIs — register them in Settings → Team → OAuth apps). When it matches, state is appended. With no hint, an invalid hint, or an unregistered URI, the browser simply lands on the EntryBit home page.

HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: entrybitresident://oauth/callback?state=<same>

The forced-logout-CSRF defense

The id_token_hint requirement is a security control, not a formality. Without it, a bare cross-site GET /api/oauth/logout embedded in any web page could force-log-out a signed-in user (a logout CSRF). By requiring a verified id_token_hint whose sub matches the current user, EntryBit ensures only a party that already holds the user’s own id_token can end their session — an attacker cannot.

In a native app

Take the endpoint from discovery (end_session_endpoint) rather than hardcoding the path:

import * as AuthSession from 'expo-auth-session';
import * as WebBrowser from 'expo-web-browser';

const { endSessionEndpoint } = await AuthSession.fetchDiscoveryAsync('https://entrybit.net');
if (!endSessionEndpoint) throw new Error('end_session_endpoint not advertised');

const logoutUrl = `${endSessionEndpoint}?${new URLSearchParams({
  id_token_hint: idToken,                // the id_token from sign-in
  post_logout_redirect_uri: redirectUri, // must be REGISTERED as a post-logout URI
})}`;

await WebBrowser.openAuthSessionAsync(logoutUrl, redirectUri);

The simplest alternative on shared devices is to sign in with an ephemeral browser session in the first place, so no cookie ever persists:

promptAsync({ preferEphemeralSession: true }); // iOS: no shared Safari cookies

A complete sign-out does both: revoke the refresh token, clear local storage, then hit this endpoint (or use an ephemeral session). See the quickstart.